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SUMMARY
Efforts to greatly reduce the flow of illicit
drugs from abroad into the United States have
so far not succeeded.  Moreover, over the past
decade, worldwide production of illicit drugs
has increased dramatically: opium and
marijuana production has roughly doubled and
coca production tripled.
Despite national political resolve to deal
with the drug problem, inherent contradictions
regularly appear between U.S. anti-drug policy
and other policy goals and concerns.  U.S.
narcotics policy seeks reduction of the supply
of illicit drugs to the United States and reduc-
tion of user demand within the United States.
On the other hand, important aspects of U.S.
foreign policy aim at promoting the political
and economic stability of U.S. friends and
allies and avoiding excessive involvement in
their internal affairs.
Pursuit of anti-drug goals can sometimes
effect foreign policy interests and bring politi-
cal instability and economic dislocation to
countries where narcotics production has
become entrenched economically and socially.
Drug supply interdiction programs and U.S.
systems to facilitate the international
movement of goods, people, and wealth are
often at odds.  U.S. international narcotics
policy requires cooperative efforts by many
nations and must operate in the context of
competing foreign policy goals.  A major area
of ongoing concern remains: how effective can
international narcotics control programs be in
helping to reduce U.S. domestic drug
consumption?
The mix of competing domestic and
international pressures and priorities has
produced an ongoing series of disputes within
and between the legislative and executive
branches concerning U.S. international drug
policy.  Congress in the 1988 Drug Act called
for a reevaluation of that policy with a view
towards formulating a broader approach.  The
Act requires the “drug czar” to submit a na-
tional drug control strategy to the Congress by
February 1st of every year.  U.S. strategy
includes Andean nation programs that call for
economic, military, and law enforcement
assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
P.L.106-246, “Plan Colombia,” a $1.3
billion military assistance focused initiative to
provide emergency supplemental narcotics
assistance to Colombia, was signed into law
July 13, 2000.  On April 9, 2001, President
Bush requested $731 in FY2002 funds for the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative.
Policy options addressed in this brief include:
—Expansion of efforts to reduce foreign
production at the source.
—Expansion of interdiction and enforcement
activities to disrupt supply lines.      
—Expansion of efforts to reduce worldwide
demand.
—Expansion of economic disincentives for
international drug trafficking.
For CRS products relevant to this sub-
ject, see CRS Issue Brief IB95025, Drug
Supply Control: Current Legislation, CRS
Report 98-159, Narcotics Certification of
Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations:
Questions and Answers, CRS Report
RL30541, Colombia: U.S. Assistance and
Current Legislation and CRS Report
RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neigh-
bors. See also: CRS Report RS20494, Ecua-





Evidence is mounting of Taliban and al Qaeda involvement in Afghanistan’s lucrative
illicit opium trade.  U.S. efforts to target terrorist funding sources are, therefore,  likely to
increasingly focus on the drug trade involvement by such groups (see CRS Report RS21041,
Taliban and the Drug Trade).
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Problem
More than 11 million Americans buy illicit drugs and use them more than once per
month, spending by most conservative estimates over $50 billion – and perhaps as much as
$150 billion or more – annually in a diverse and fragmented criminal market.  Such drugs are
to varying degrees injurious to the health, judgment, productivity and general well-being of
their users.  The addictive nature of many of these drugs, their high price and their illegality
play a role in more than half the street crime in the United States.  The U.S. illicit drug market
generates enormous profits that enable the growth of diversified international criminal
organizations, extend their reach into local neighborhoods, legitimate business, and even
national governments.  Such profits provide drug trafficking organizations with the resources
to effectively evade and compete with law enforcement agencies, and in some instances, to
challenge the authority of national governments.
Measured in dollar value, at least four-fifths of all the illicit drugs consumed in the U.S.
are of foreign origin, including virtually all the cocaine and heroin.  Of the marijuana
consumed in the United States, 25% to 35% is domestically produced and virtually all of the
hallucinogens and illegally marketed psychotherapeutic drugs and “designer” drugs are of
domestic origin.
Little is known about the distribution of revenues from illicit drug sales, but foreign
supply cartels exercise considerable control over wholesale distribution in the United States
and illicit proceeds are often laundered and invested through foreign banks and financial
institutions.
The federal anti-drug initiative has two major elements: (1) reduction of demand and (2)
reduction of supply.  Reduction of demand is sought through education to prevent
dependence, through treatment to cure addiction and through measures to increase prices and
risk of apprehension at the consumer level.  Reduction of supply (which generally accounts
for about 66% of the federal anti-drug control budget) is sought by programs aimed at
destabilizing the operations of illicit drug cartels at all levels, and by seizing their products and
assets.  As most illicit drugs are imported, a major interdiction campaign is being conducted
on the U.S. borders, at ports of entry, on the high seas, and along major foreign transshipment
routes  and at production sites.  An international program of source crop eradication is also
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being pursued.  Federal policies for the reduction of illicit supply have major international
components.  These are discussed below.
Current International Narcotics Control Policy
The primary goal of U.S. international narcotics policy is to reduce the supply of illicit
narcotics flowing into the United States.  A second and supporting goal is to reduce the
amount of illicit narcotics cultivated, processed, and consumed worldwide.  U.S. international
narcotics control policy is implemented by a multifaceted strategy that includes the following
elements:  (1) eradication of narcotic crops, (2) interdiction and law enforcement activities
in drug producing and drug transiting countries, (3) international cooperation, (4)
sanctions/economic assistance, and (5) institution development.  The U.S. State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has the lead role coordinating
U.S. international drug intervention and suppression activities.
In 1992, the Administration sought the authorization and appropriation of $173 million
for INL (formerly INM) costs and international operations for FY1993.  Congress approved
legislation authorizing (in H.R. 6187) and appropriating (in H.R. 5368) $147.78 million for
INM programs for FY1993 and 1994.  In H.R. 6187, Congress also revised some of the
guidelines governing the procedures by which the President can certify that a major
drug-producing or drug- transit country is cooperating fully with the U.S. anti-drug program
and is thus qualified to receive U.S. foreign aid.  It also changed the terms of the reporting
requirements, eliminating some items from the list of subjects that must be discussed but also
requiring more information on action to combat money laundering and to prevent the
diversion of precursor chemicals (those used in the production of illicit drugs) from their
legitimate commercial uses.
In 1993, the Administration requested a $147.78 million appropriation for INM
operations, as previously authorized.  On May 26, the House Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee recommended reducing it to $100 million for FY1994.  The
House voted on it June 10, during consideration of the FY1994 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2295), and it became law September 30, 1993.  For FY1995, the
Administration requested $232 million for international narcotics control programs.  This
amount included funding for U.S. military counter-narcotics support (formerly FMF) and for
narcotics-related sustainable development (formerly ESF).  The State Department’s FY1996
international narcotics control request totalled $213 million, up $108 million from FY1995
appropriations levels.  The Department’s FY1997 request for international narcotics totaled
$193 million, up $78 million from FY1996 appropriations levels of $115 million. FY1997
appropriations totaled $213 million.  The FY1998 request totaled $214 million, up $21
million from FY1997 appropriations levels of $193 million. FY1998 appropriations levels
totaled $210 million; FY1999 levels totaled $236 million plus a $232.6 million emergency
supplemental; $295 million was requested for FY2000, and $312 million for FY2001 with
$305 million appropriated for FY2001 which was reduced to $303.8 million after rescissions.
Eradication of Narcotic Crops
A long-standing U.S. official policy for international narcotics control strategy is to
reduce cultivation and production of illicit narcotics through eradication.  In 2000, the United
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States supported programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in 9 countries.  These
efforts are conducted by a number of government agencies administering several types of
programs.  The United States supports eradication by providing producer countries with
chemical herbicides, technical assistance and specialized equipment, and spray aircraft.  The
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funds programs designed to promote
economic growth and to provide alternative sources of employment for the people currently
growing, producing, or processing illicit drugs.  AID also provides balance of payments
support (especially to the Andean countries) to help offset the loss of foreign exchange (from
diminished drug exports) occurring as a result of U.S.-supported anti-drug programs.  U.S.
eradication policy receives informational support from the State Department’s Office of
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (formerly the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)) which
publicizes the dangers of drug abuse and trafficker violence.  In addition, AID sponsors drug
education and awareness programs in 33 Latin American, Asian, and East European
countries. Planned FY2000 funding for eradication and alternate development programs
totaled approximately $126 million.  The FY 2001 request totals $118 million — about 44
% of the State Department’s FY2001 $312 million  narcotics control budget request. This
$118 million, includes $5 million for coca eradication in Peru and approximately $8.8 million
for Bolivia.
  
Interdiction and Law Enforcement
A second element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy is to help host
governments seize illicit narcotics before they reach America’s borders.  Training of foreign
law enforcement personnel constitutes a major part of such endeavors.  The Department of
State funds anti-narcotics law enforcement training programs for foreign personnel from more
than 70 countries.  In addition, the Department of State provides host country anti-narcotics
personnel with a wide range of equipment to perform effectively, and U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents regularly assist foreign police forces in their efforts to
destabilize trafficking networks.  U.S. efforts to promote effective law enforcement against
narcotics traffickers also include suggestions to nations on means to strengthen their legal and
judicial systems.
International Cooperation
On October 22, 1995, former President Clinton in his U.N. address commemorating the
organization’s 50th anniversary, stressed the importance of international cooperation in
combating organized crime and drug smuggling, which were characterized as important forces
that threaten efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world. Essentially all elements of U.S.
international narcotics control strategy require international cooperation.  By use of
diplomatic initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, the Department of State encourages and
assists nations to reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking in illicit drugs.  These bilateral
agreements and international conventions have thus far been largely ineffective in reversing
the growth of international narcotics trafficking, in part because they lack strong enforcement
mechanisms and are not uniformly interpreted by member nations.
U.S. international narcotics control strategy also requires cooperation among
governments to coordinate their border operations to interdict traffickers.  To this end, the
U.S. government has provided technical assistance for anti-drug programs in other countries.
For FY2001, the State Department’s international narcotics control budget request totaled
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$312 million to assist programs at least 30 countries, including $52 million for Bolivia, $48
million for Peru, and $35 million for Colombia.  Also requested was $50 million for
interregional aviation support, to provide aircraft for anti-drug programs in other countries.
The United States also participates in multilateral assistance programs through the U.N.
International Drug Control Program and actively enlists the aid and support of other
governments for narcotics control projects.  The U.N. currently assists 67 developing
countries through development, law enforcement, education, treatment, and rehabilitation
programs.  For FY2001, the Clinton Administration requested $12 million for narcotics
control-related contributions to international organizations, the majority of which constitutes
the U.S. voluntary contribution to the U.N. drug control program.
Sanctions/Economic Assistance
A fourth element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy involves the threat of,
or application of, sanctions against drug producer or trafficker nations.  These range from
suspension of U.S. foreign assistance to curtailment of air transportation.  Current law
requires the President to submit to Congress by March 1 each year a list of major illicit drug
producing and transit countries that he has certified as eligible to receive U.S. foreign aid and
other economic and trade benefits.  This sets in motion a 30-calendar day review process in
which Congress can override the President’s certification and stop U.S. foreign aid from
going to specific countries.
Certification may be granted because a major illicit drug producing or transit country has
“cooperated fully” with U.S. narcotics reduction goals or has taken “adequate steps on its
own” to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 U.N.
anti-drug trafficking convention.  A country not qualifying on this basis may escape
imposition of sanctions if the President certifies U.S. “vital national interests” preclude
implementation of sanctions on that country.  (See section on Certification Issues, below.)
U.S. sanctions policy has been augmented with programs of economic assistance to
major coca producing countries (see section entitled “Use of Sanctions or Positive Incentives”
and section on President Bush’s Anti-Drug Strategy). For FY2001 the State Department
requested approximately $49 million for drug related alternative development: approximately
$5 million for Colombia; $27 million for Peru; approximately $17 million for Bolivia and
$100,000 for Mexico.
Institution Development
A fifth element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy increasingly involves
institution development, i.e., strengthening judicial and law enforcement institutions and






The primary goal of U.S. international narcotics control policy is to stem the flow of
foreign drugs into the United States.  A number of options have been proposed to reshape and
more effectively implement U.S. international narcotics control policy.  Whatever options are
selected will likely require funding on a scale sufficient to affect  the drug problem.  It is
estimated that the illicit drug industry generates between $100 billion and $500 billion dollars
a year for criminal organizations.  The Office of National Drug Policy cited the figure of $110
billion for 1989.  Policymakers face the challenge of deciding the appropriate level of funding
required for the nation’s international narcotics control efforts within the context of
competing budgetary priorities.
Another challenge facing the U.S. international narcotics control efforts concerns how
to most effectively implement policy.  Some observers argue that current U.S. policy is
fragmented and overly bilateral in nature.  These analysts suggest that to achieve success,
policy options must be pursued within the context of a comprehensive plan with a multilateral
emphasis on implementation.  For example, they point out that some studies indicate that
interdiction can actually increase the economic rewards to drug traffickers by raising prices
for the products they sell.  They agree, however, that interdiction as part of a coordinated
plan, can have a strong disrupting and destabilizing effect on trafficker operations.  Some
analysts suggest that bilateral or unilateral U.S. policies are ill-suited for solving what is in
effect a multilateral problem.  They cite the need for enhancing the United Nations’ ability to
deal effectively with the narcotics problem and for more international and regional
cooperation and consultation on international narcotics issues.  Proponents of bilateral policy
do not necessarily reject a more multilateral approach.  They point out, however, that such
multinational endeavors are intrinsically difficult to arrange, coordinate, and implement
effectively.
Some analysts believe that current efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the
United States have essentially failed and that other objectives, policies, programs, and
priorities are needed.  Five major options, which have been suggested, in various
combinations as part of an overall effort, are set out below.
Another major congressional concern will be how to fund the new international initiative
within existing budgetary constraints, and how other domestic, military, or foreign aid
programs may be affected because of increased anti-drug expenditures.
Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Production at the Source
This option involves expanding efforts to reduce the growth of narcotic plants and crops
in foreign countries before conversion into processed drugs.  Illicit crops may either be
eradicated or purchased (and then destroyed).  Eradication of illicit crops may be
accomplished by physically uprooting the plants, or by chemical or biological control agents.
Development of alternative sources of income to replace peasant income lost by
nonproduction of narcotic crops may be an important element of this option.
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Proponents of expanded efforts to stop the production of narcotic crops and substances
at the source believe that reduction of the foreign supply of drugs available is an effective
means to lower levels of drug use in the United States.  They argue that reduction of the
supply of cocaine — the nation’s top narcotics control priority — is a realistically achievable
option.
Proponents of vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal
crop eradication, argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of
eliminating narcotic crops.  They staunchly maintain that, coupled with intensified law
enforcement, such programs will succeed since it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the
field than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of
U.S. cities.  Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers
will devote fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to concealing more
expensive and refined forms of the product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction
of the foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful
impact on levels of illicit drug use in the United States.  They suggest that even if the supply
of foreign drugs destined for the U.S. market could be dramatically reduced, U.S. consumers
would simply switch to consumption of synthetic drug substitutes.  Thus, they maintain, the
ultimate solution to the U.S. drug problem is reduction of demand at the source and not
reduction of supply at the source.
Some also fear that environmental damage will result from herbicides.  As an alternative,
they urge development, research, and funding of programs designed to develop and employ
biological control agents such as coca-destroying insects and fungi that do not harm other
plants.
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is politically
feasible since many areas in the world will always be beyond U.S. control and influence.  Such
critics refer to continuously shifting sources of supply, or the so-called “balloon syndrome”:
when squeezed in one place, it pops up in another.  Nevertheless, many point out that the
number of large suitable growth areas is finite, and by focusing simultaneously at major
production areas, substantial reductions can be achieved if adequate funding is provided.
Some also question the value of supply reduction measures since world production and
supply of illicit drugs vastly exceeds world demand, making it unlikely that the supply surplus
could be reduced sufficiently to affect on the ready availability of illicit narcotics in the U.S.
market.  Such analysts also suggest that even if worldwide supply were reduced dramatically,
the effects would be felt primarily in other nation’s drug markets.  The U.S. market, they
argue, would be the last to experience supply shortfalls, because U.S. consumers pay higher
prices and because U.S. dollars are a preferred narco-currency.
Political and Economic Tradeoffs.  Many suggest that expanded and effective
efforts to reduce production of illicit narcotics at the source will be met by active and violent
opposition from a combination of trafficker, political and economic groups.  In some nations,
such as Colombia, traffickers have achieved a status comparable to “a state within a state.”
In others, allegations of drug-related corruption have focused on high-level officials in the
military and federal police, as well as heads of state.  In addition, some traffickers have
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aligned themselves with terrorist and insurgent groups, and have reportedly funded political
candidates and parties, pro-narcotic peasant workers and trade union groups, and high
visibility popular public works projects to cultivate public support through a “Robin Hood”
image.  Because many groups that benefit economically from coca are so well armed, if the
United States were successful in urging foreign governments to institute widespread use of
chemical/biological control agents, cooperating host governments could well face strong
domestic political challenge and violent opposition from trafficking groups.  Heavy military
protection, at a minimum, would be required for those spraying or otherwise eradicating.  It
is possible that U.S. officials, businessmen and real assets might not be immune to
terrorist-style attacks by traffickers worldwide.
For some countries, production of illicit narcotics and the narcotics trade has become
an economic way of life that provides a subsistence level of income to large numbers of
people from whom those who rule draw their legitimacy.  “Successful” crop reduction
campaigns seek to displace such income and those workers engaged in its production.  In this
regard, these campaigns may threaten real economic and political dangers for the
governments of nations with marginal economic growth.  Consequently, many analysts argue
that the governments of such low-income countries cannot be expected to launch major crop
reduction programs without the substitute income to sustain those whose income depends on
drug production.
Use of Sanctions or Positive Incentives.  Those promoting expansion of efforts
to reduce production at the source face the challenge of instituting programs that effectively
reduce production of narcotic crops and production of refined narcotics without creating
unmanageable economic and political crises for target countries.  A major area of concern of
such policymakers is to achieve an effective balance between the “carrot” and the “stick”
approach in U.S. relations with major illicit narcotics producing and transit countries.
Proponents of a sanctions policy linking foreign aid and trade benefits to U.S.
international narcotics objectives argue against “business as usual” with countries that permit
illicit drug trafficking, production, or laundering of drug profits.  They assert that this policy
includes a moral dimension and that drug production and trafficking is wrong, and that the
United States should not associate with countries involved in it.  Such analysts maintain that
U.S. aid and trade sanctions can provide the needed leverage for nations to reduce production
of illicit crops and their involvement in other drug related activities.  They argue that both the
moral stigma of being branded as uncooperative and the threat of economic sanctions prod
many otherwise uncooperative nations into action.  They further stress that trade sanctions
would be likely to provide highly effective lever as most developing countries depend on
access to U.S. markets.
Opponents of a sanctions policy linking aid and trade to U.S. international narcotics
objectives argue that sanctions may have an undesirable effect on the political and economic
stability of target countries, making them all the more dependent on the drug trade for
income; that sanctions have little impact because many countries are not dependant on U.S.
aid; that sanctions historically have little effect unless they are multilaterally imposed; and that
sanctions are arbitrary in nature, hurt national pride in the foreign country, and are seen in
many countries as an ugly manifestation of “Yankee imperialism.”  Finally, an increasing
number of analysts suggest that if sanctions are to be fully effective, they should be used in
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conjunction with additional positive incentives (subject perhaps to a congressional
certification/approval process) to foster anti-drug cooperation.
Alternatively, some suggest positive incentives instead of sanctions.  They believe that
narcotics producing countries must be motivated either to refrain from growing illicit crops,
or to permit the purchase or destruction of these crops by government authorities.  Many
argue that since short term  economic stability of nations supplying illegal drugs may depend
upon the production and sale of illicit narcotics, it is unrealistic to expect such nations to
meaningfully limit their drug-related activities without an alternative source of income.  The
House Appropriations Committee report on the 1993 foreign operations appropriations bill
suggested that when it comes to narcotics related economic development “there is too little
emphasis in either actual funding or policy.”
It has been suggested by some analysts that a massive foreign aid effort — a so-called
“mini-Marshall Plan” — is the only feasible method of persuading developing nations to curb
their production of narcotic crops.  Such a plan would involve a multilateral effort with
participation of the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, other industrialized nations
susceptible to the drug problem, and the rich oil producing nations.  The thrust of such a plan
would be to promote economic development, replacing illicit cash crops with other
marketable alternatives.  Within the framework of such a plan, crops could be purchased or
else destroyed by herbicidal spraying or biological control agents while substitute crops and
markets are developed and assured.  Any such program would be coupled with rigid domestic
law enforcement and penalties for non-compliance.  Thus, it would require a U.S.
commitment of substantially increased enforcement assets to be used against both growers
and traffickers, and some observers assert it  might require direct U.S. military involvement
at the request of the host country.
Critics find much to be concerned about in these positive incentive concepts.  They warn
of the precedent of appearing to pay “protection” compensation — i.e., providing an incentive
for economically disadvantaged countries to go into the drug export business.  They also warn
of the open-ended cost of agricultural development programs and of extraterritorial police
intervention.  Finding markets for viable alternative crops is yet another major constraint.
Expansion of Interdiction and Enforcement Activities to Disrupt
Supply Lines/Expanding the Role of the Military
Drug supply line interdiction is both a foreign and domestic issue. Many argue that the
United States should intensify law enforcement activities designed to disrupt the transit of
illicit narcotics as early in the production/transit chain as possible — well before the drugs
reach the streets of the United States.  This task is conceded to be very difficult because the
United States is the world’s greatest trading nation with vast volumes of imports daily flowing
in through hundreds of sea, air, and land entry facilities and its systems have been designed
to facilitate human and materials exchange.  This has led some analysts to suggest that the
military should assume a more active role in anti-drug activities.
Congress, in the late 1980s and prior to appropriations for FY1994, had urged an
expanded role for the military in the “war on drugs.”  The idea of using the military is not
novel.  Outside the United States, military personnel have been involved in training and
transporting foreign anti-narcotics personnel since 1983.  Periodically, there have also been
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calls for multilateral military strikes against trafficking operations, as well as increased use of
U.S. elite forces in preemptive strikes against drug fields and trafficker enclaves overseas.
The military’s role in narcotics interdiction was expanded by the FY1990-1991 National
Defense Authorization Act.  The conference report (H.Rept. 100-989) concluded that the
Department of Defense (DOD) can and should play a major role in narcotics interdiction.
Congress, in FY1989 and FY1990-1991 authorization acts, required DOD to promptly
provide civilian law enforcement agencies with relevant drug related intelligence; charged the
President to direct that command, control, communications, and intelligence networks
dedicated to drug control be integrated by DOD into an effective network; restricted direct
participation by military personnel in civilian law enforcement activities to those authorized
by law; permitted the military to transport civilian law enforcement personnel outside U.S.
land area; expanded the National Guard’s role in drug interdiction activities; and authorized
additional $300 million for DOD and National Guard drug interdiction activities.
The Clinton Administration’s FY1997 DOD drug budget request totalled $814.1 million,
which was more or less equivalent to FY1996 estimated budget authority of $814.3 million.
FY1998 appropriations totaled $808.58 million the FY1999 appropriations totaled $775.6
million.  The FY2000 request was for $788.1 million.
Despite the military’s obvious ability to support drug law enforcement organizations,
questions remain as to the overall effectiveness of a major military role in narcotics
interdiction.  Proponents of substantially increasing the military’s role in supporting civilian
law enforcement narcotics interdiction activity argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national
security threat to the United States; that only the military is equipped and has the resources
to counter powerful trafficking organizations; and that counter drug support provides the
military with beneficial, realistic training.
In contrast, opponents argue that drug interdiction is a law enforcement mission, it is not
a military mission; that drug enforcement is an unconventional war which the military is
ill-equipped to fight; that a drug enforcement role detracts from readiness; that a drug
enforcement role exposes the military to  corruption; that it is unwise public policy to require
the U.S. military to operate against U.S. citizens; and that the use of the military may have
serious political and diplomatic repercussions overseas. Moreover, some in the military remain
concerned about an expanded role, seeing themselves as possible scapegoats for policies that
have failed, or are likely to fail.
Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Worldwide Demand
Another commonly proposed option is  to increase policy emphasis on development and
implementation of programs worldwide that aim at increasing public intolerance for illicit drug
use.  Such programs, through information, technical assistance, and training in prevention and
treatment, would emphasize the health dangers of drug use, as well as the danger to regional
and national stability.  The State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
and AID currently support modest efforts in this area.  Some believe these programs should
be increased and call for a more active role for the United Nations and other international
agencies in development and implementation of such demand reduction programs.
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Expansion of Economic Disincentives for Illicit Drug Trafficking
Proponents of this option say that the major factor in the international drug market is not
the product, but the profit.  Thus, they stress, international efforts to reduce the flow of drugs
into the United States must identify means to seize and otherwise reduce assets and profits
generated by the drug trade.
Policymakers pursuing this option must decide whether laws in countries where they
exert influence are too lenient on financial institutions, such as banks and brokerage houses,
which knowingly facilitate financial transactions of traffickers.  If the answer is “yes,” national
leaders would then take concerted action to enact harsher criminal sanctions penalizing the
movement of money generated by drug sales, including revocation of licenses of institutions
regularly engaging in such practices.  Finally, those supporting this option favor increased
efforts to secure greater international cooperation on financial investigations related to money
laundering of narcotics profits, including negotiation of mutual legal assistance treaties
(MLATs).
Initiatives by the Clinton Administration
On February 7, 1994, the Clinton Administration released its National Drug Control
Strategy.  Both domestically and internationally, the strategy sought to downplay the drug
issue as a single policy driving priority.  Domestically, drug policy is seen as linked with other
policy-driving goals, and is envisioned as a component element of efforts to spur economic
growth, reform health care, curb youth violence, and “empower” communities.
Internationally, the policy further integrated the priority of drug trade destruction with other
foreign policy goals such as democracy, market-based economic growth, and human rights.
Overall, the strategy represented a shift in emphasis from international programs to domestic
programs — particularly those aimed at prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.
The strategy continued to define cocaine as the primary threat and envisioned a shift of
resources from interdiction beyond U.S. borders and territorial seas towards host nation
enforcement programs.  The new Federal Drug Control Budget requested $13.18 billion in
budget authority for FY1995, an 8.6% increase ($1,043.6 million) over the amount enacted
in FY1994.  Also, it reflected the Administration’s decision to increase funding for demand
reduction (prevention and treatment).  The FY1995 split for supply reduction and demand
reduction was 59% and 41%, respectively, as compared to a 63% and 37% split in FY1994.
The FY1995 budget request sought to restore FY1994 congressional cuts for funding of
international narcotics control programs.  The request sought $231.8 million for international
programs, a 21.7% increase over FY1994 appropriations levels.
The Administration’s FY1997 request reflected public concern over crime and drug
related crime as well as concern over rising drug use by high school students; proposed
overall drug spending was up by 9.3% over estimated FY1996 enacted levels.  As a
continuing response to concern over violent crime, the FY1997 supply/ demand reduction
split was 67% to 33%, compared to 59% and 41% in FY1995.
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The Administration’s FY1997 request totaled $15.1 billion.  Resources for international
programs, constituting 3% of the drug budget request, would have increased by 25.4% from
$320 million in FY1996 to $401 million in FY1997.  The State Department’s FY1997 request
for international narcotics programs totaled $193 million, up $78 million from FY1996
enacted levels of $115 million.  Major components of the State Department request included
(1) $116.2 million for Latin American Programs; (2) $27.2 million for Latin American
inter-regional aviation support; and (3) $18.8 million for programs in Asia, Africa and
Europe.  FY1997 appropriations for State Department international narcotics control
programs totaled $213 million – $20 million above the amount formally requested by the
State Department.  The Administration’s overall FY1997 funding request for interdiction,
which constituted 10% of the federal drug control budget, increased by 7.3% over FY1996
levels, from $1.3 to $1.4 billion.
On September 30, 1996, P.L. 104-208 was enacted, which included FY1997 foreign
operations appropriations.  It appropriated $213 million for State Department international
narcotics control programs ($20 million of which was for anti-crime and $193 million of
which was for international narcotics); allowed narcotics assistance to Burma under specified
circumstances; would withhold $2.5 million from Mexico unless vigorous and effective
counter-narcotics efforts take place; appropriated $35.8 million to the Office of National Drug
Control Policy; and appropriated $83.8 million to support U.S. Customs air or maritime
interdiction and demand reduction programs.
The Administration’s FY1998 budget request proposed $16 billion in national drug
control funding, a 5.4% increase over the estimated $15.2 billion in FY1997 budget authority.
The February 25, 1997 national strategy proposed an 8.4% increase for FY 1998 over
enacted FY1997 levels for international programs and a 1.8% reduction in interdiction
funding.  The FY1998 State Department request for international narcotics and crime totaled
$230 million ($214 million for narcotics and $16 million for anti-crime) — an approximate
10%-increase for international narcotics programs.  For FY1998. Congress appropriated $210
million for international narcotics control and $20 million for crime–an approximate 8%
increase over FY1997 appropriations levels for narcotics. For FY1999 Congress appropriated
$236 million for international narcotics control and $20 million for international crime — an
emergency supplemental provided another $232.6 million for international narcotics control.
FY2000 appropriations were $273.8 million for narcotics and $30 million for international
crime control. The FY 2001 request totals $267 million for narcotics and $45 million for
crime.
In September 21, 1999 congressional testimony, SOUTHCOM Commander, General
Charles Wilhelm, stated that the United States wanted to use an airfield in Costa Rica as a
base to provide increased monitoring of heavily used Eastern Pacific drug trafficking routes.
The U.S. currently has Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) at Curacao and Aruba in the
Netherlands Antilles, and at Manta, Ecuador. Upgrades and expanded capabilities for FOLs
in the Americas are expected to require a total of $122.5 million in military construction
funding in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, according to DOD estimates.
The Clinton Administration’s  international strategy aimed to shift gradually from
policies that emphasize transit zone interdiction to cooperative programs with countries that
demonstrate the will to combat the international narcotics trade.  Although not defined in the
Clinton  strategy, “transit zone” may be roughly defined as that area within which U.S.
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interdiction forces can operate between the South American continent and the 12-mile
contiguous zone offshore the United States.  Implementation of the Clinton policy emphasized
programs that focus on source country institution building, particularly law enforcement and
judicial institutions.  Public awareness and demand reduction programs in foreign countries
are given modestly enhanced emphasis.
Bush Administration Anti-Drug Strategy
The direction of drug policy under President George W. Bush is not expected to be an
immediate top administration foreign policy priority.  However, growing concern by some in
Congress over the military component of Plan Colombia and Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s avowed predisposition to facilitate the exercise of power through coalitions and
alliances where practicable could well lead to a strategic review of the U.S. support role for
plan Colombia.  One possible outcome would be policy which more regionally focused and
which is based on closer cooperation with international aid donor nations.  Given what is
generally believed to be an Administration desire to avoid open-ended entanglements like the
Vietnam war, it is likely that the U.S. military component of plan will be subject to review as
well.
Issues of concern to the 107th Congress relating to international drug control policy
include the following:
(1) Can the Plan Colombia as currently envisioned have a meaningful impact on reducing
drug shipments to the U.S. or in reducing the current level of violence and instability in
Colombia? To what degree can a counter-drug plan which does not aim to deal a decisive
blow to insurgent operations Colombia be expected to meaningfully curb drug production and
violence there? 
(2) To what degree might a more regional approach the drug problem in Colombia prove
more effective and if so how might such an expanded initiative be funded?
(3) How does U.S. involvement in anti-drug efforts in the Andean nations affect other
aspects of American foreign policy in the region, and in Latin America generally?  Does a
concentration on drug-related issues obscure more fundamental issues of stability, democracy,
and poverty; i.e., to what degree are drugs a major cause, or result, of the internal problems
of certain Latin American countries?
(4) In the case of Colombia and other nations where insurgents are heavily involved in
the drug trade, how can the United States ensure that U.S. military aid and equipment is in
fact used to combat drug traffickers and cartels, rather than diverted for use against domestic
political opposition or used as an instrument of human rights violations?  How great is the risk
that such diversions could take place, and is the degree of risk worth the possible gains to be
made against drug production and trafficking?   
(5)  How extensive is drug-related corruption in the armed forces and police of the
Andean nations?  What impact might such corruption have on the effectiveness of U.S.
training and assistance to these forces?
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(6) Will an active role for the military in counter-narcotics support to foreign nations (i.e.
Colombia) result in U.S. casualties?  If so, is there an exit strategy and at what point, if at all,
might Presidential actions fall within the scope of the War Powers Resolution; i.e., does the
dispatch of military advisers to help other governments combat drug traffickers constitute the
introduction of armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”? (The War Powers Resolution requires
the President to report such an introduction to Congress, and to withdraw the forces within
60 to 90 days unless authorized to remain by Congress.)
(7) Will the evolving strategy under the Bush Administration produce better results than
previous strategies in reducing illicit drug use in the United States and in supporting U.S.
narcotics and other foreign policy goals overseas?  Is a proper balance of resources being
devoted to domestic (the demand side) vs. foreign (the supply side) components of an overall
national anti-drug strategy?  Are efforts to reduce the foreign supply level futile while
domestic U.S. demand remains high?  Are efforts to reduce domestic demand fruitless as long
as foreign supplies can enter the country with relative impunity?
Certification Issues
On March 1, 2001, President Bush certified 20 of the 24 designated drug producing or
transit countries as fully cooperative in counter-narcotics efforts, and he granted vital national
interest certifications to Cambodia and Haiti.  Only two countries – Afghanistan and Burma
– were decertified and subject to sanctions.  President Bush’s determinations were very
similar to the determinations of President Clinton in the previous year, except that Nigeria and
Paraguay were elevated from national interest waiver status to fully cooperative status.  
In the past, determinations to certify Mexico have often been the most contentious, and
Mexico has been a focus of congressional attention and an important focus of U.S. foreign
narcopolicy.  While Mexico has been fully certified each year by a series of U.S. presidents,
congressional resolutions to disapprove Mexico’s certification were introduced in 1987, 1988,
1997, 1998, and 1999, and congressional criticisms of Mexico’s certifications were voiced
in many years.  Resolutions of disapproval failed to reach floor action in most years, but both
houses passed separate versions of weakened resolutions of disapproval in 1997, and a Senate
resolution of disapproval reached the floor but was defeated in 1998.  (For more detail, see
CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: Congressional Action, 1986-2001,
by K. Larry Storrs.)
Following the July 2000 election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of
Mexico, a number of legislative measures were  introduced to modify the drug certification
requirements, and these initiatives were mentioned when President Bush met with President
Fox in Mexico in mid-February 2001.  While President Bush certified Mexico as fully
cooperative in drug control efforts on March 1, 2001, a number of legislators continued to
press for modification of the existing certification process.  On April 3, 2001, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported out a substitute version of S. 219, which (1) would
suspend the existing drug certification procedures for a three year trial period, (2) would
require the President to identify by October 1 of each year major drug-transit or major illicit
drug producing countries, and to deny assistance to any country that has failed demonstrably,
during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under
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international counternarcotics agreements.  The measure expresses the sense of Congress that
the United States should at the earliest feasible date in 2001 convene a multilateral conference
of relevant countries to develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies, and it
urges the President to request legislative changes to implement the strategies no later than one
year after enactment.  (For more information see CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification
Requirements and Proposed Congressional Modifications in 2001.)
A less controversial – more collegial and sanctionless – multilateral [drug performance]
evaluation system (MEM) has been established under the auspices of the Organization of
American States (OAS). This mechanism is seen by many as a vehicle to undermine and
facilitate abolishment of the existing U.S. sanctions-oriented unilateral certification process
which is often an irritant to major illicit drug producing countries, and which, opponents
argue, does little to promote anti-drug cooperation. 
With regard to disputes over the identification of major drug producing and drug-transit
countries, in November 1997 former President Clinton notified the Hill of his decision to
remove Syria and Lebanon from the list of major producing or transit countries; 24 Members
of Congress signed a letter calling upon Mr. Clinton to retain Syria on the list.  Earlier in the
year, Members of Congress sent a letter to the Secretary of State questioning whether North
Korean drug trafficking activity warranted that nation’s placement on the “majors” list.
Subsequently, since 1998 North Korea has been included in the State Department’s annual
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).
In his November 10, 1999 designation of countries on the drug “majors list” former
President Clinton removed Aruba and Belize. Added as countries or regions of concern, but
not on the list, were Aruba, Belize, the entire Eastern and Southern Caribbean (including the
Leeward and Windward Islands and Netherlands Antilles) and North Korea. 
Plan Colombia
On July 13, 2000, U.S. support for Plan Colombia was signed into law (P.L. 106-246).
Included was $1.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations in equipment, supplies,
and other counter narcotics aid primarily for the Colombian military. The plan aims to curb
trafficking activity and reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over five years.  Plan
components include helping the Colombian Government control its territory; strengthening
democratic institutions; promoting economic development; protecting human rights; and
providing humanitarian assistance. Included as well is $148 million for Andean regional drug
interdiction and alternative development  programs.   Some observers speculate that without
enhanced U.S. aid, Colombia risks disintegration into smaller autonomous political units —
some controlled by guerilla groups that are heavily involved  in drug trafficking and violent
crime for profit activity.  Other observers  caution that narcotics related assistance to
Colombia – at best – can produce serious reductions in illicit drug production only within a
4- to 6 year time frame and warn against enhanced U.S. involvement in a conflict where clear
cut victory is elusive and to a large degree dependant on reduction of a seemingly insatiable
U.S. domestic appetite for illicit drugs.  Moreover, of growing concern in the Administration
and in Congress is the so called “spillover” effect of Plan Colombia on neighboring nations
such as Ecuador where Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) narco-linked insurgents increasingly operate. For additional data
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on proposed aid to Colombia, see CRS Report RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia
Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).  See also CRS Report RS20494,  Ecuador:
International Narcotics Control Issues.
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
On April 9, 2001, the Bush Administration requested $731 million in FY2002 funding
for a broader regional strategy called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, with $399 million
for Colombia, $156 million for Peru, $101 million for Bolivia, $39 million for Ecuador, $15
million for Brazil, $10 million for Venezuela, and $11 million for Panama. The initiative’s title
was subsequently changed to the Andean Regional Initiative in what some see as an
Administration public relations attempt to de-emphasize its largely counterdrug component.
Data released by the State Department on May 14, 2001, placed requested funding levels for
the initiative $882 million (see CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative(ARI):
FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors).
On July 24th, 2001, the House passed the foreign operations appropriations bill (H.R.
2506), which would result in total funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ARI) at
$826 million.  On July 26th, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the foreign
operations appropriations bill further reducing ARI funding to $718 million, well below the
President’s request of $882 million. 
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